In part one I proposed to Helene Odfjell.
She has not replied. Her lawyers have not replied either, which I am taking as a yes.
So I did what every sensible man does before marrying a woman with five drilling rigs and 1.35 billion dollars. I read the prenup. All of it. The rig contracts, the bond terms, the related party notes, the depreciation schedule, the part where her relatives send her invoices.
Two things I can tell you already. She earns 15 percent on her price. And every stock screener on earth says she loses money. Both are true, and I will show you why.
Most of the prenup I loved. One page I almost missed. And one page made me put the ring back in my pocket.
Article by article.
Who she is
The Odfjells have been at sea since 1914. Bergen shipping money. In 1979 the family split in two. One branch took the chemical tankers, and that is the Odfjell you see painted on ships today. The other branch, Johan Odvar Odfjell and his son Abraham, took the small tankers and a strange little side business started in 1973. It drilled holes in the seabed.
Abraham ran it for three decades. In 2007 he gave it to his two daughters.
Helene❤️ and Marianne.
In September 2013, at the very top of the last offshore cycle, Marianne’s trust sold 56 million shares in the Oslo IPO at 42 kroner. About 400 million dollars, into her pocket. The company got nothing. Helene kept her 70 percent.
Then oil went from 100 to 30.
By June 2016 the stock was 4.20. Her sister had the cash. Helene, my love, had empty rigs, a wall of bank debt, and several bankers who called more often than I do.
Every big driller went through Chapter 11 in those years. Seadrill twice. Noble. Valaris. Diamond. Pacific Drilling. Shareholders got zero. Only two companies came through without handing the keys to the lenders. Transocean, which printed shares to survive. And Odfjell, which never restructured at all.
What Helene did instead is the whole reason I proposed.
She kept the rigs working for Equinor and Aker BP, at bad prices, because a working rig keeps a bank patient. In 2016 the Norwegian banks let her push repayments back. In 2018, at the bottom, she bought a brand new rig from a Korean yard, built for an owner who never took delivery, for 505 million dollars. A new one costs close to a billion today. She paid for it partly with 75 million of preference shares sold to a stranger, Akastor, because selling common stock at the bottom was the one thing she refused to do. Four years later she bought those preference shares back and closed the book.
In 2021 the family scrapped its oldest rig, the Deepsea Bergen, built in 1983. It had worked for 37 years. Then in December 2025 they bought a rig they had already been operating for three years, the Deepsea Bollsta, for 480 million, and gave it the old name.
That is the woman. Now the contract.
Article 1. What she brings to the marriage
Five rigs. Part one told you where they drill. Here is what they earn and when each one comes free. The company does not publish exact dates, so this is its own contract chart plus the announcements.
The CEO puts the fleet average near $480,000 a day.
Each rig has a personality.
The Stavanger is the loyal one. Aker BP booked it in 2022, when this market was still on its knees, for five years. It has run at 99 percent six quarters in a row, at the lowest rate in the fleet, and it is locked until 2030. That is the price of the safety you are buying.
The Bergen is the one that paid for itself fastest. Bought for 480 million in December. In its first six months it earned 45 million of EBITDA, about 90 a year. Then Vår Energi signed 518 million for three years starting in 2028. That is what running a rig for three years before you buy it gets you.
The Atlantic is the one that had a bad spring. More on that in a minute.
The Nordkapp is the one you watched in the storm in part one. Newest, highest spec, and before Christmas two independent brokers set its rate for 2028. The number will be public. I promised you my guess. It is at the end of Article 3.
She also manages three rigs for other owners. About 20 million dollars of EBITDA a year. A side dish.
Article 2. What she earns, and why your screener says she loses money
Open any screener and Odfjell shows negative free cash flow. Minus 216 million for 2025. Minus 157 million for the last twelve months. Then you read me claiming 15 percent and you close the tab.
Both numbers are true. Here is what is inside them.
